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INTRODUCTION

How much does law matter in election cases where the partisan
stakes are high? At first glance, election cases may seem the worst
context for studying the influence of law on judicial decisionmaking.
Election cases, which decide the applicable rules for a given election,
often determine election outcomes and therefore feature the highest
political stakes in the balance. There is great temptation for judges to
decide these cases in a partisan fashion to help their side. And we have
found empirically in earlier work that judges do often appear influenced
by partisanship in deciding these cases for their own parties in a way
that suggests politics matter more than law.1 But in this Article, we
argue that election cases actually offer a unique opportunity to study
the role of law in judicial decisionmaking precisely because we can
assume partisanship influences judges in these cases.
Thomas Simmons Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law.
Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. Many thanks to Tracey George,
Darren Hutchinson, Tonja Jacobi, Jeffrey Segal, Dan Smith, and Emerson Tiller for their valuable
comments on earlier versions of this Article. Thanks also to Eitan Blander and Ian Gaunt for
excellent research assistance.
1.
See Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Long Shadow of Bush v. Gore: Judicial
Partisanship in Election Cases, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1436-43 (2016) (finding statistical
relationships among judicial partisanship, party campaign finance, and judicial decisions in
election cases).
*

**
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If judges prefer to decide election cases consistent with their
partisan interests, then they may decide these cases contrary to
partisan interests mainly when the out-party litigant's case has
strengths sufficient to overcome this usual, countervailing influence of
partisan loyalty. For this reason, we use lower court judges' decisions
contrary to their partisan interests (e.g., for a litigant from the opposite
party, or against one from their own) as a proxy for underlying case
strength. Lower court judges' decisions against their partisan interests
buck the normal pattern of partisan loyalty and therefore offer an
inference of greater case strength compared to other decisions that are
consistent with partisan expectations. Put another way, case strength
is assumed to be greater for winning litigants when lower court judges
went against their own partisan interests to decide for the winning
litigants, than in cases where lower court judges predictably decided in
favor of their own party's interests. With this inference of case strength
in hand, we then can examine whether case strength is predictive for
state supreme court decisionmaking in these cases on appeal.
We find that our measure of case strength is predictive of state
supreme court decisionmaking in election cases. We find, for instance,
that state supreme court justices from both parties are most likely to
affirm when case strength is indicated by our measure. This is
particularly true when case strength aligns with a justice's own
partisan interests such that both law and partisanship direct the same
result on appeal. When presented with a winning Democratic litigant
who won before a Republican lower court judge, Democratic justices
voted to affirm 88.9% of the time on appeal. Republican justices voted
to affirm at an 86.4% rate for winning Republican litigants who won
before a Democratic judge below. But even when case strength
conflicted with a supreme court justice's partisan loyalty, case strength
won out most of the time. For instance, when faced with a Republican
litigant who triumphed before a Democratic judge below, indicating
case strength, Democratic justices still voted to affirm 82.6% of the time
despite having to grant final victory to the opposing party. Similarly,
Republican justices voted to affirm 66.6% of the time for Democratic
litigants who won before a Republican lower court judge. Our other
results suggest that where case strength could not be inferred by the
lower court disposition, partisanship generally predicted quite a bit,
with some interesting complications that we discuss further within.
In Part I, we introduce our earlier work on election cases and
judicial partisanship before setting forth our new approach to studying
the influence of law on judicial decisionmaking. We describe the special
nature of the election cases in our database that allow more persuasive
inferences of judicial partisanship than typically derived in empirical
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work on judicial behavior. We then explain our new approach for
measuring case strength based on counterpartisan decisionmaking by
judges. In Part II, we apply our approach to case strength to our dataset
and present our results. In a nutshell, partisanship appears to matter
as expected and influences decisions, but law, as represented by case
strength, matters as much or more. Finally, in Part III, we distinguish
our approach to measuring law's influence on judicial decisionmaking
from existing approaches and explore the implications of our findings.
We find a partisan asymmetry, this time for cases when a state supreme
court justice considers a lower court victory by an opposite-party
litigant before an opposite-party judge. Democratic and Republican
justices decide these cases very differently, and we close by weighing
explanations for this finding.
I. THE RIVALRY BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS IN ELECTION CASES
A. Partisanshipin Election Cases
In earlier work, we found that judges are regularly influenced
by their partisan ties when deciding election cases and suspected that
their partisan loyalties have something to do with it.2 By partisan
loyalties, we mean the " 'low' politics of partisan political advantage," in
the form of deciding cases "to promote the interests of a particular
political party and install its candidates in power." 3 But even this
rawest form of partisanship is difficult as an empirical matter to
untangle from ideology and the influence of law.
The reason is, for most substantive areas of election law, the
ideological positions of the major parties map closely to what would be
predicted by raw partisanship and political advantage. Republican
judges might vote in favor of voter identification laws, or against vote
dilution claims under the Voting Rights Act, because they would like to
help the Republican Party as a political matter. However, Republican
judges, as ideological conservatives, are also more likely than
Democrats to view racial discrimination claims skeptically and to
narrowly decide vote dilution claims under the Voting Rights Act. 4
Although Republican judges' decisions on these questions may produce
political benefits for their party, their decisions are motivated not by
partisanship in this telling but rather by ideological motivations that
2.
See id. at 1452.
3.
Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J.
1407, 1409 (2001).
See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judgingthe Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
4.
1, 37-39 (2008).
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produce partisan benefits only by coincidence. 5 This basic
methodological complication clouds any simple conclusion that judges
are driven by raw partisanship in election law cases. As a result, it is
difficult to tell how much law and politics matter in judicial
decisionmaking for these cases when the law and politics are all mixed
up together.
We offered a new methodological approach for this
complication-candidate-litigated election disputes. We collected data
on election cases in which a candidate was a litigant decided by state
supreme courts from 2005 through 2014. The cases arose as legal
disputes usually brought by or against a candidate in a particular
election and focused mainly on state election law questions, with
particular relevance for an election then-upcoming or which had just
occurred. The legal questions thus tended toward obscure statutory
questions interpreting state election code, often with very little
doctrinal precedent or ideological history. 6 These were, we think, cases
where the legal ideological stakes were typically low. There usually was
no consistent, easily identifiable ideological position for either
conservatives or liberals about how to decide these cases separate from
the partisanship of the litigants. More importantly, to the extent there
were conservative or liberal positions in these cases, they did not
consistently align with long-term political advantage for either party
such that a pattern of partisan favoritism can be explained as
ideologically determined.7
The general absence of strong ideological predispositions in
these election cases foregrounds the short-term political payoff
resulting from how the cases are decided. To be clear, the long-term
political advantage between the major parties from any particular
decision was largely uncertain in the vast run of our cases. It would be
difficult, for example, to predict how a ruling today on candidate
eligibility requirements would help Democrats or Republicans over the
long run, or whether the question would ever matter again. However,
the short-term political impact of the decision would be clear for the
election involving a candidate-litigant in the case. These election cases
generally featured a particular election to which the court's ruling
would be applied and which therefore offered a nice test of those judges'

5.
See generally Justin Levitt, The PartisanshipSpectrum, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1787
(2014) (contrasting "coincidental" partisanship with "tribal" partisanship).
6.
See Mark J. McKenzie, The Influence of Partisanship, Ideology, and the Law on
RedistrictingDecisions in the Federal Courts, 65 POL. RES. Q. 799, 802, 807-08 (2012) (finding that
judicial partisanship appears lower where legal constraints were higher in one person, one vote
cases as compared to voting rights cases and other types of redistricting cases).
7.
See Kang & Shepherd, supra note 1, at 1414-15 (describing the cases in greater detail).

2017]

JUDGING LAW IN ELECTION CASES

1759

partisan loyalty. The combination of short-term political impact and low
ideological salience made these cases a good test of judicial partisan
loyalty. These cases come as close as we can hope to stripping away the
high politics of principle and leave as most salient the low politics of
partisan advantage.
Our first analysis of this data yielded several key findings.8
First, Republican judges systematically favored their own political
party in election cases at a rate 36% higher than Democratic judges.
Republican judges decided for their party's interests 59.3% of the time,
while Democratic judges sided with their party 43.4% of the time.9 As a
point of reference, judges appointed on a nonpartisan basis, together
with independent judges in partisan election states, favored the
Republican litigant in 50.7% of cases involving Republican litigants and
favored the Democratic litigant in 59.5% of cases involving Democratic
litigants. If anything, these party-neutral judges set a baseline that
seems to slightly favor Democrats on the merits.
Second, Republican partisan loyalty is not only significantly
stronger than Democratic partisan loyalty, it covaries with campaign
finance influences that affect the costs and benefits of siding with one's
party. Democratic partisan loyalty does not. 10 We find that party
campaign finance support is associated with greater partisan loyalty
among Republican elected judges, but has no significant effect on
Democratic judges. Campaign contributions from the Republican Party
and its allies are associated with an increased likelihood that
Republican elected judges will vote in favor of their party's interests.
However, it is noteworthy that campaign contributions to Republican
elected judges are not predictive for lame duck incumbents who are
vacating their seats."

8.
See id. at 1417-18.
9.
We cannot declare that Democratic judges do not display any partisan bias because it is
a bit uncertain how often partisan judges would decide for their party in the absence of partisan
loyalty. However, in addition to the baseline set by nonpartisan and independent judges mentioned
above, the Priest-Klein hypothesis hints that the baseline should be in the ballpark of 50%. See
George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputesfor Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1,
17-19 (1984). State supreme court cases have been appealed at least once, if not twice, which
indicates both sides believe they have a chance ultimately to prevail. Party litigants must weigh
finite financial resources for these efforts as well as potential damage to their political reputation
before litigating any unmeritorious claims. Given these costs, aggregated over 407 cases, the
Priest-Klein hypothesis suggests that neither party's objective expectation of victory should
diverge significantly from 50%.
10. See Kang & Shepherd, supra note 1, at 1437-40 (providing data supporting this
conclusion); see also Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The PartisanFoundationsof Judicial
CampaignFinance, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1275-83 (2013) (finding a similar partisan asymmetry
in campaign finance and judicial decisionmaking across a wider spectrum of cases).
11. See Kang & Shepherd, supra note 1, at 1440 (comparing data from judges who run for
reelection and retiring judges).
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Third, partisan loyalty by Republican judges appears to be
tempered by the potential for public attention. The effect of party
campaign contributions becomes statistically insignificant for federal
and state elections where public attention and media coverage are
typically greater. 12 By contrast, the effect of party money in encouraging
partisan loyalty remains significant for less visible county and city
elections where the public is less likely to notice. Along similar lines,
partisan loyalty diminishes as the amount of attack advertising in
recent state supreme court elections increases. 13 Where there has been
more attack advertising, incumbent judges might want to avoid facing
similar campaign attacks in their next race and thus may be less likely
to engage in partisan favoritism that potentially subjects them to
greater criticism.
Our results support suspicions that partisanship affects judicial
decisionmaking in election cases, particularly for Republican elected
judges, but what requires more attention in our analysis is the influence
of law. We have found that politics appear to matter in judicial
decisionmaking, but of course, there is also a wealth of authority
demonstrating that law matters to judges as well. 14 Judges appear to
care about legal reasoning, plain meaning, and precedent within a
traditional legal model of judicial decisionmaking based on neutral
principles. Judges adhere closer to or further from this ideal depending
on the clarity of the law and political salience of the case, among other
things. However, research demonstrates that law exerts a variable
influence on judges such that their decisionmaking cannot be reduced
entirely to their political preferences.15 The harder question, especially
for politically salient cases like election disputes, is the degree to which
judges are directed by legal reasoning as opposed to their political
preferences. We seek to investigate this question next by constructing
a novel proxy for measuring case strength within our dataset that
allows us to gauge the competing influences of law and politics on
judges.
12. See id. at 1440-41 (discussing the relationship between election visibility and partisan
voting).
13. See id. at 1442-43 (analyzing data regarding attack ads).
14. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998) (reviewing the
various factors that influence judicial decisionmaking, including precedent); Howard Gillman,
What's Law Got to Do with It? JudicialBehavioralists Test the "Legal Model" of Judicial Decision
Making, 26 LAw & SOC. INQUIRY 465, 466 (2001) ("The entire structure of legal education and the
nature of the judicial process in the United States is premised on the assumption that, one way or
the other, law matters."); Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin's
Chain Novel Theory: Studying the PathofPrecedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156 (2005); Edward Rubin
& Malcolm Feeley, CreatingLegal Doctrine, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1989, 1990 (1996).
15. See Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, What Is Legal Doctrine?, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 517
(2006) (contending that law is both legal and political and suggesting important factors).
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B. Law in Election Cases
Law should matter in judicial decisionmaking. By law, we mean
that "reasoned judgment from precedent or statute and consideration
of [the judicial] role in the legal system." 16 Law under a traditional legal
model of judicial decisionmaking serves as a constraint on judicial
discretion. It suggests, at least under certain circumstances, a mode of
reasoning under which judicial decisions are more likely to be viewed
as correct and legitimate under shared understandings of what legal
authority dictates. We assume that judges prefer to decide cases
according to their legal merits, all other things being equal. Our
objective is to assess the relative influence of the legal merits on judicial
decisions in election cases, particularly vis-A-vis the partisan loyalty we
already have observed.17
The fact that law is largely nonideological in our election cases,
as we argue above, does not mean that the legal merits in these cases
do not matter. We believe that our cases tend not to be ideologically
valenced or associated with rich case law precedent, but individual
cases can vary in their strength on the merits just like cases in other
areas of law. For example, some cases have better or worse facts for the
winning litigants. Some cases may be adjudicated under higher or lower
standards of proof and review. A lack of rich precedent, textual
direction, or ideological valence may mean that appellate adjudication
of a winning litigant's case below may be less predictable than in other
areas of law, but there is still variance in case strength that ought to
matter. Winning litigants in these cases at the lower court therefore
should vary in terms of their case strength and how confident they
ought to have been based on the legal merits, independent of partisan
considerations, on appeal before the state supreme court.
We introduce law into our analysis with a novel proxy measure
for the winning litigant's case strength in our state supreme court
decisions-the interaction between the party affiliation of the winning
litigant and of the lower court judge below. The state supreme court
cases in our dataset are appellate decisions reviewing a disposition of
the case by a state trial court or intermediate appellate court. We coded
the cases to determine the partisanship of the lower court judges below
and added it to our analysis. If the lower court judge is partisan, we
assume, all things being equal, that the judge would ideally prefer to
decide in favor of her party's interests (which means for her in-party

16. Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate
InterdisciplinaryIgnorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 251, 253 (1997).
17. See Section I.A.
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litigant or against the other major party's litigant). But things are not
always equal. As we have explained, cases vary in terms of their legal
merits such that they may cut in favor of, or against, the judge's party
in a particular case. Some cases present legal merits that encourage a
partisan decision, while other cases present legal merits that
discourage one. The case strength of any particular case may align with
the lower court judge's partisan loyalty or may conflict with it.
The partisan affiliation of the lower court thus enables us to
infer something about the strength of the winning litigant's case. Our
intuition is simple. We infer case strength from the basic premise that
partisan lower court judges would prefer to decide election cases in
favor of their own party's interest if they have sufficient discretion
under the applicable law. Lower court judges therefore are predisposed
to favor their own party unless the legal merits of the case compel a
decision for the other party. When a lower court judge decides the case
against her party's interests, the decision cannot be explained simply
by partisan loyalty. Instead, when a Republican judge decides in favor
of a Democratic litigant or a Democratic judge decides in favor of a
Republican litigant, it suggests that the winning out-party litigant's
legal case was strong enough to overcome a countervailing influence of
partisan loyalty. For this reason, decisions by a partisan lower court
judge against her party's interest can be assumed to be, on average over
the run of cases, stronger on the legal merits than decisions in favor of
her own party. We therefore use a lower court decision contrary to
partisan loyalty as a proxy for greater case strength for the winning
litigant.
Michael Bailey, Brian Kamoie, and Forrest Maltzman rely on a
similar intuition in their study of the solicitor general's influence on the
U.S. Supreme Court. 18 They found that Supreme Court Justices were
particularly responsive to the solicitor general's amicus briefs when he
took an ideologically unexpected position in the case. An ideologically
incongruous position by the solicitor general suggests that the position
was not simply political, but instead more likely to have been motivated
by the substantive merits of the case. For instance, "[g]iven that the
liberal S.G. is predisposed toward supporting liberal outcomes, these
justices could reasonably infer that the S.G.'s decision to support a
conservative position is driven by legal concerns."1 9 The common
intuition is that a legal position taken contrary to political loyalty
signals substantive strength on the merits, irrespective of partisanship.

18. See Michael A. Bailey et al., Signals from the Tenth Justice: The PoliticalRole of the
Solicitor General in Supreme Court Decision Making, 49 AM. J. POL. Scl. 72 (2005).
19. Id. at 76.
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Based on this logic, we can identify cases where the winning
litigant's case is likely to be stronger and where this likelihood is less
on average. In our dataset, we expect that the strongest cases on
average for the winning litigant in the lower court will be where the
partisanship of the winning litigant and the lower court judge do not
match. These are cases where the lower court judge decided for the
winning litigant even though it went against the judge's partisan
interests. Table 1 sets forth the four categories of cases where we see
this type of partisan mismatch between the lower court judge and the
winning litigant. On appeal before the state supreme court, we expect
the likelihood of voting to affirm to be higher on average in these four
categories of cases if substantive law actually matters to supreme court
justices and influences their decisionmaking.
TABLE 1: PARTISAN MISMATCH BETWEEN WINNING LITIGANT AND
LOWER COURT
Party of winning
litigant in lower
court

Party of lower
court judge (or
majority party if

Party of
supreme court
justice

_panel)J

(1)

Dem

Rep

Dem

(2)

Rep

Dem

Rep

(3)

Rep

Dem

Dem

(4)

Dem

Rep

Rep

Not only do we expect affirmance to be more likely for these
stronger substantive cases, but we also can differentiate among these
four categories of cases based on the partisanship of the state supreme
court on appeal. In predicting affirmance in these election cases, we
expect votes to affirm to be more likely in categories (1) and (2) where
the supreme court justice's partisanship matches the winning litigant's
than in categories (3) and (4) where they do not. For categories (1) and
(2), the supreme court justice receives what should be a stronger case
on average for the winning litigant, because the lower court judge of the
opposing party already has gone against partisanship to decide for the
litigant. On appeal, then, the supreme court justice reviews a case
where the law is likely to be on the winning litigant's side, and in
categories (1) and (2), one in which the partisan loyalty of the supreme
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court justice also encourages affirmance. Law and partisan loyalty
coincide on appeal for affirmance. 20
For categories (3) and (4), the cases are again strong for the
winning litigant, but the partisanship of the winning litigant and the
supreme court justice on appeal no longer match. Law boosts the
winning litigant's chances of affirmance above average, but partisan
loyalty works against the winning litigant. As a result, we would expect
the affirmance rates will be higher for categories (1) and (2) where law
and partisan loyalty coincide, than for categories (3) and (4) where they
do not. Again, we do not have any concrete expectations about whether
partisan loyalty or case strength will win out in categories (3) and (4)
where they conflict, but we know that partisan loyalty matters and
expect it will cut into the affirmance rate relative to categories (1) and
(2).21

There are four remaining categories of cases where there is no
signal of case strength by our measure. Table 2 presents the election
cases where the partisanship of the winning litigant and lower court
judge are matched. These cases are effectively the baseline for saying
that the affirmance rate for the strong cases in Table 1 should be higher
than average. Affirmance should be higher for the cases in Table 1
where there is an inference of case strength for the winning litigant
relative to these cases in Table 2 where there is not. For the cases in
Table 2, the lower court has decided these cases consistently with
partisan loyalty. This fact does not mean that partisan loyalty fully
explains the decision as opposed to law. It simply means that the lower
court reached its decision in favor of the winning litigant without
needing to overcome partisan loyalty in the opposite decision. As a
consequence, in contrast to the cases in Table 1, there is no inference
about case strength.

20. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanshipand Obedience to
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowingon the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2159 (1998)
("Judges are more likely to obey legal doctrine when such doctrine supports the partisan or
ideological policy preferences of the court majority.").
21. See, e.g., id. ("In those cases in which doctrine does not support the partisan or ideological
policy preferences of the court majority, we expect somewhat more disobedience.").
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TABLE 2: PARTISAN MATCH BETWEEN WINNING LITIGANT AND LOWER

COURT
Party of winning
litigant in lower
court

Party of lower
court judge (or
majority party if
panel)

Party of supreme
court justice

(5)

Rep

Rep

Rep

(6)

Dem

Dem

Rep

(7)

Dem

Dem

Dem

(8)

Rep

Rep

Dem

The cases in Table 2 instead may reveal something about the
degree of partisanship by the state supreme court justices. In these
cases, justices may be less constrained by law and freer to exercise their
partisan discretion in favor of in-party litigants and against out-party
litigants. In categories (5) and (7), Democratic and Republican supreme
court justices can help their in-party litigants simply by upholding their
in-party lower court's judgment. In categories (6) and (8), supreme court
justices can help their in-party's interests by reversing the out-party
lower court's decision for the out-party litigant. The winning litigant in
these cases may have compelling legal cases on the merits, or they may
not. We cannot infer one way or the other about case strength where
the lower court acted according to partisan expectation. But the cases
in Table 2 may reveal the shape and magnitude of differences in
partisan loyalty between Democratic and Republican supreme court
justices for these cases where partisan loyalty is most likely to appear.
Our measure of case strength gives us leverage on two questions
about state supreme court decisionmaking that we hope to explore here.
The first question is the degree to which case strength matters to state
supreme court justices in these highly politicized election cases. Within
political science, the attitudinalist school long claimed that law has
little influence on the U.S. Supreme Court, which decides cases almost
entirely based on the policy preferences of its Justices. 22 Although that
extreme view has moderated with the development of the study of
judicial behavior, the rivalry between legal and political influences on
judicial decisionmaking still speaks to the heart of the field. By
22. See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Lax & Kelly T. Rader, Legal Constraintson Supreme Court Decision
Making: Do JurisprudentialRegimes Exist?, 72 J. POL. 273, 273 (2010) ("Now, a common view in

political science, that of Spaeth and Segal (1999) and Segal and Spaeth (2002), is even more
extreme: law has little or no influence over the case votes of Supreme Court Justices.").
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comparing state supreme court votes in cases with different lower court
partisanship, we can explore the degree to which law, or at least our
indirect measure of case strength, trumps partisanship. Do justices go
against partisan interest in what we assume are the stronger cases for
the other party?
A second question is understanding the partisan asymmetry
that we described in our earlier findings from initial study of this data.
Why do Republicans display greater partisan loyalty in these cases than
Democrats? In our preceding article, we theorized an answer based on
political science literature on the different levels of organizational
capacity and internal cohesion between the major parties. 23 We hoped
to find out more by exploring the underlying partisan asymmetry in
greater depth. If Republican and Democratic justices decided election
cases differently, we sought more granularity in describing these
differences across varying types of cases in Figure 1, particularly as we
added the greater detail of case strength and lower court partisanship
to the analysis. Figure 1 illustrates how the influence of case strength
and partisan loyalty can reinforce or conflict for both Democratic and
Republican justices in deciding whether to affirm.

23.

See Kang & Shepherd, supranote 1, at 1448-49.
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FIGURE 1: HYPOTHESIZED INTERACTION OF CASE STRENGTH AND
PARTISANSHIP
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Do Republican justices decide more cases in their partisan
interest because they are less likely than Democratic justices to accede
to case strength to the contrary? Do Republicans display a distinct
pattern of appellate judicial decisionmaking, or do they simply mirror
Democrats but go to a further partisan extreme? We investigate these
questions and report below.
II. DATA AND RESULTS

To explore political partisanship, case strength, and judicial
decisionmaking, we rely on a comprehensive dataset of election cases
from several different sources. First, a team of independent researchers
from Emory University School of Law collected and coded roughly 2,500
votes in election cases from all fifty states from 2005 to 2014.24 The team
began with a dataset of all state supreme court cases within our time
period classified by the Westlaw Key Number System under six election
24. This coding project was supported financially by a grant from the American Constitution
Society and was administered by Emory University School of Law to pay our team of student
research assistants. The American Constitution Society had no input over the study.
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law subcategories. 2 5 The team was instructed to code cases in which a
major-party candidate in an upcoming or recently decided election was
listed as a litigant, but to remove voter identification, campaign finance,
redistricting, and voting rights cases as too ideologically valenced for
our purposes, as well as flagging other inappropriately ideological cases
outside those categories. The resulting final dataset included votes from
more than 400 election cases and almost 500 state supreme court
justices. As a practical matter, the final dataset consisted primarily of
election disputes focused on state law questions, not unlike the 2000
presidential election litigation in the Florida state courts.
The researchers coded whether each justice, sitting as a member
of a multi-judge appellate panel, cast a partisan vote. We defined a
partisan vote as a vote either for a justice's own party or against the
justice's opposing party in election cases. In cases involving a litigant
from the same party as the justice, the justice is coded as voting in favor
of her party's interest when the justice votes in favor of the litigant from
the same party. In cases not involving a litigant from the same party
but involving a litigant from the opposing party (for example, a
Democratic election candidate in a case with a Republican justice), a
partisan vote is one in which the justice votes against the opposingparty litigant. For example, in a case involving a Democratic candidate
contesting the results from an election that he lost, a Republican justice
voting to affirm the election results would be coded as having cast a
partisan vote.
The team also coded details of each election case, including the
issue in the case, the geographic basis of the relevant election, and the
litigants in the case. Additionally, the team collected data on each
justice, including her political party affiliation, 26 the method by which
the justice was selected for the court, and the date of her next reelection
or reappointment. Of the initial 400 cases, 245 cases involved either a
Republican or Democratic litigant and were decided by state supreme
25. We used the Westlaw Key Number System to define issue categories: Election Districts,
Boards, and Officers is 142TII. Voters is 142TII. Political Activity and Associations is 142TIV.
Nominations is 142TV1. Conduct of Election is 142TV11. Offenses and Prosecutions is 142TX. The
base category is Westlaw Key Number 142T. However, some of these categories ultimately
contributed very few, if any, cases to our final dataset.
26. Determining the party affiliations of judges elected in partisan elections is
straightforward: each judge is listed on the ballot as the nominee from one of the political parties
or as an independent. For judges appointed by the governor, we use the party of the governor as a
proxy for the party affiliation of the judge. Many judges elected in nonpartisan elections also have
evident party affiliations: some states use partisan primaries to choose candidates for the general
election, some judges make their party affiliation clear in campaign materials, and the party
affiliation of other judges is apparent given the contributions to the judges' campaigns. For the few
judges appointed or elected by the legislature, we use the majority party of the state legislature as
a proxy for the party affiliation of the judge.
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court justices for which our research assistants were able to determine
political party affiliation. Our initial results, reported in Table 3, reveal
that, compared to Democratic justices, Republican justices are more
likely to vote for their own party or against the opposing party in the
election cases.
TABLE 3: JUDICIAL PARTISAN LOYALTY IN FULL DATA
Rate at which state supreme court justices
vote for same party or against opposing party_
Democratic justices

43.4% (309)

Republican justices

59.3% (565)

To further investigate judicial partisanship, research assistants
then examined the lower court proceedings of the 245 cases with partyidentified justices and partisan litigants. The research assistants
gathered information about which litigant initially brought each case
in the lower court as either plaintiff or appellant, the party affiliation
of the lower court judges, 27 and the winning litigant in the lower court
proceedings. Several cases dropped out of the data during the coding
process: cases in which there were no lower court proceedings; cases for
which no political party affiliation of lower court judges could be
determined; and cases for which there was no clear winner in the lower
courts. The research assistants found detailed information on the lower
court proceedings for 126 cases heard in thirty-one states. Thirty-seven
of the cases were heard in state intermediate appellate courts before
the supreme court appeal, while the other eighty-nine were appealed
directly from the trial court to the state supreme court. The trial court
cases were typically heard by a single judge, while a panel of judges
generally presided over the intermediate appellate court cases. When
the lower court data was merged with the data on state supreme court
justices' votes, the data included 773 individual votes from 286
individual supreme court justices.
Tables 4 and 5 report the rates at which supreme court justices
voted to affirm the lower court judgment subdivided by the party
affiliation of the winning litigant below and the party affiliation of the
lower court judge (or the majority party of the panel). Table 4 reports

27. The political parties of the judges sometimes could be determined from election records,
newspaper articles, campaign contribution data, and other web searches where partisanship could
not be determined as described above.
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the affirmance rates for Republican state supreme court justices, and
Table 5 reports the rates for Democratic justices. 28
TABLE 4: VOTING BY REPUBLICAN SUPREME COURT JUSTICES

Winner in lower
court

Party of lower court
judge (or majority
party if panel)

Dem

Dem

35.7%

98

Rep

Rep

64.7%

68

Dem

Rep

66.6%

42

Rep

Dem

86.4%

44

TABLE

Likelihood of vote
affirming lower
court decision

N

5: VOTING BY DEMOCRATIC SUPREME COURT JUSTICES

Winner in lower
court

Party of lower court
judge (or majority
__party if panel)

Likelihood of vote
affirming lower
court decision

N

Rep

Rep

66.7%

36

Dem

Dem

53.7%

90

Rep

Dem

82.6%

46

Dem

Rep

88.9%

18

Although the number of observations is small for one cell, the
results generally indicate that case strength for the winning litigant
below, even in politically charged election cases, can override
partisanship. In Table 6, it is evident that the supreme court justices of
both parties are likely to affirm the lower court's decision when the
lower court decided in favor of a litigant from the opposing political
party. In these cases, the lower court put aside partisanship to decide
in favor of an out-party litigant, suggesting case strength in favor of the
out-party litigant. High rates of supreme court justices voting to affirm
these lower court decisions, listed in Table 6, suggest that case strength
dominates the partisan loyalty of the supreme court justices as well.

28. We refer to the rate at which supreme court justices individually vote to affirm the lower
court as their affirmance rate, even though actual affirmance of a lower court decision can be
effectuated only by a group vote of a supreme court as a collective institution. Individual justices
cast only individual votes to affirm.
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TABLE 6: VOTING IN CASES WHERE PARTISANSHIP OF WINNING
LITIGANT AND LOWER COURT Do NOT MATCH (STRONGER CASES)

Winner in
lower court

Party of lower
court judge (or
majority party
if panel)

Supreme court
justice's party

Dem

Rep

Dem

88.9%

18

Rep

Dem

Rep

86.4%

44

Rep

Dem

Dem

82.6%

46

Dem

Rep

Rep

66.6%

42

Likelihood of
vote affirming
the lower court

N

Predictably, both Democratic and Republican supreme court
justices are more likely to affirm a lower court ruling that favors a
litigant from the justices' own political party. That is, Democratic
justices are more likely to affirm a strong case in favor of a Democratic
litigant (88.9%) than a Republican litigant (82.6%), even though that
means affirming a Republican lower court's decision. Similarly,
Republican supreme court justices are more likely to affirm a case in
favor of a Republican litigant (86.4%) than a Democratic litigant
(66.6%), even though they are affirming a Democratic lower court's
opinion. Although the differences are only statistically significant for
the Republican justices' voting (p-value is 0.03), the patterns suggest
that, even for strong cases, partisanship plays some role.
Indeed, other voting patterns confirm the importance of
partisanship, especially among Republican supreme court justices. As
reported in Table 7, Democratic supreme court justices voted to affirm
about half of the cases appealed from a Democratic lower court that
found in favor of a Democratic litigant. However, for Republicans, the
likelihood of affirming a lower Republican court's ruling in favor of a
Republican litigant is 64.7%.
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TABLE 7: VOTING IN CASES WHERE PARTISANSHIP OF WINNING
LITIGANT AND LOWER COURT MATCH, PART ONE

Winner in
lower court

Party of lower
court judge (or
majority party

Supreme court

justice's party

Likelihood of
vote afwrming
the lower court

N

if panel)

Dem

Dem

Dem

53.7%

Rep

Rep

Rep

64.7%

90

j

68

Additionally, Republican supreme court justices exhibit a
predictable pattern in their review of Democratic lower court decisions
in favor of Democratic litigants. As reported in Table 8, Republican
supreme court justices vote to affirm decisions by a Democratic lower
court in favor of a Democratic litigant only 35.7% of the time-the
lowest affirmance rate for Republican justices across all categories of
cases. The low affirmance rate is consistent with the other voting
patterns of Republican justices. Without a partisan mismatch between
winning litigant and lower court, there is no inference here indicating
case strength. Moreover, the winning litigants in these cases are
Democrats, so partisan loyalty encourages Republican supreme court
justices to overturn the lower court decisions.
TABLE 8: VOTING IN CASES WHERE THE PARTISANSHIP OF WINNING
LITIGANT AND LOWER COURT MATCH, PART TWO

Winner in
lower court

Party of lower
court judge (or
majority party
if panel)

Supreme court
justice's party

Rep

Rep

Dem

66.7%

36

Dem

Dem

Rep

35.7%

98

Likelihood of
vote affirming
the lower court

N

However, the same pattern of hostility against the out-party is
not true for Democratic supreme court justices. Democratic justices vote
to affirm Republican lower court decisions in favor of Republican
litigants 66.7% of the time, far greater than the corresponding 35.7%
rate for Republican affirmance of Democratic decisions in favor of
Democrats. More surprisingly, this affirmance rate in favor of
Republican litigants actually is higher than Democrats' 53.7%
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affirmance rate of Democratic lower court decisions in favor of
Democratic litigants.
What is odd is that the Democratic justices in our dataset were
more likely to vote to affirm Republican decisions in favor of
Republicans than vote to affirm Democratic decisions in favor of
Democrats. In either case, there was no inference of case strength based
on mismatched partisanship between lower court and winning litigant.
One would predict that, all other things being equal, Democratic
justices would be more likely to affirm Democratic decisions in favor of
Democrats rather than Republican decisions for Republicans. At least
in the former set of cases, partisan loyalty encourages affirmance, while
in the latter set, partisan loyalty seems to discourage it. The difference
between these two affirmance rates, it should be noted, is not
statistically significant, but even the absence of difference between the
rates is surprising. It is possible that this result is simply an anomaly
as a function of the small number of cases where a Democratic justice
voted on a Republican lower court decision in favor of a Republican
litigant. There were only 36 cases that fell into this category, compared
to a much greater number for the other three possible categories of
matched partisanship between lower court and winning litigant. We
discovered no obvious explanation based on closer study of the
characteristics of these cases, though we discuss some possibilities in
the next Part.
III. LAW'S INFLUENCE AND PARTISAN ASYMMETRY (AGAIN)

Within political science, the attitudinalist school long claimed
that law has little to no influence on the U.S. Supreme Court, which
decides cases based on the policy preferences of its Justices. 29 In this
direction, political science has comprehensively documented a
consistent partisan divide between Democratic and Republican judges
at virtually every level of the American judiciary. But empirical work
on judicial decisionmaking has also demonstrated that law matters as
well to judges. Legal precedent and reasoning construct a judicial
methodology for resolving cases, identify stronger and weaker cases in
the process, and constrain judicial discretion to decide cases according
to judges' political preferences. Both politics and law matter, but the
difficult question is when and how politics and law matter, particularly
if the political stakes are high. In our study of election cases, we find

29. See, e.g., Lax & Rader, supra note 22, at 273. See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD
J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993) (articulating the
attitudinalist model).
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that case strength generally produces consensus irrespective of
partisanship, but when justices are less constrained by law, a familiar
asymmetry in partisanship recurs. Republican judicial decisionmaking,
at least among state supreme court justices, appears particularly
influenced by partisanship where there is no signal of case strength,
while Democratic decisionmaking appears unassociated with partisan
considerations by comparison.
We find that Democratic and Republican state supreme court
justices largely agree in affirming what we code as strong cases for the
winning litigant below. Democratic justices voted to affirm strong cases
for winning Republican litigants 86.4% of the time and strong cases for
winning Democratic litigants 88.9% of the time. Republican justices
voted to affirm strong cases for winning Republican litigants 86.4% of
the time and winning Democrats 66.6% of the time. These rates are
greater than the overall affirmance rate of 54.5% in our data and
greater than the affirmance rate of 51.3% for cases we did not code as
strong cases. Substantive case strength for the winning litigant appears
to matter even in these election cases where the partisan stakes are
high.
As expected, both Democratic and Republican justices were more
likely to vote to affirm strong cases for winning in-party litigants than
for out-party litigants. For the former, justices are motivated not only
by the legal merits of the winning litigant's case but also potentially by
partisan loyalty. Where law and partisan loyalty are so aligned, we saw
the highest affirmance rates across all categories of cases by both
Republican and Democratic justices. When justices were presented with
strong cases for winning out-party litigants, affirmance rates remained
relatively high, but not as high for in-party litigants. In these cases, the
strong case of the winning litigant encouraged affirmance but also
would be tempered by the countervailing influence of partisanship.
Affirmance by Democratic justices decreased slightly from 88.9% to
86.4%, but affirmance by Republican justices fell off more significantly
from 86.4% to 66.6%. That said, affirmance rates remained relatively
high for strong cases even for out-party litigants. In this sense, case
strength prevailed over partisanship when they conflicted, particularly
for Democratic justices.
This approach for identifying case strength is novel and quite
different from the usual methodology in political science. The typical
approach to gauging the impact of law on judicial decisionmaking is to
operationalize the varied factual circumstances of individual cases for
a specific, fixed question of law. By doing so, political scientists can
assess judicial outcomes based on the strength of the facts for the
litigants and therefore gauge the degree to which judges appear guided
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by the strength of the facts as prescribed by law. A good example of this
approach is Herbert Kritzer and Mark Richards's study of U.S.
Supreme Court decisionmaking in search and seizure cases.3 0 Kritzer
and Richards coded the facts of search and seizure cases to determine
the location or object of the search; whether the search was full or
partial; whether a warrant was obtained; whether the lower court found
the officer had probable cause; whether the search was incident to
lawful arrest, followed but was not incident to lawful arrest, or followed
unlawful arrest; and finally, whether the search fell under an accepted
exception to the requirements for a warrant. 3 1 They found that these
relevant facts generally influenced the Justices' voting in these cases in
the expected direction given the case law and controlling for ideology,
and that these facts shifted in influence predictably with changing
precedent on search and seizure. Kritzer and Richards concluded that
law mattered and constrained judicial discretion in these cases. 32
Our approach has a potentially important advantage over this
established method of operationalizing law. It permits analysis of an
entire area of law, encompassing the wide diversity of legal questions
in the election cases from our dataset. The fact-based method for
operationalizing law requires a generally fixed, somewhat narrow legal
question for which the factual predictors of case outcomes are the same
across individual cases. To predict case strength, the established
method must assume that a particular factual condition will increase
the likelihood of a particular judicial decision across all cases, so the
associated legal question must be fixed across cases irrespective of
judge and jurisdiction. Our approach does not similarly limit us to a
single, narrow legal question to infer case strength. We infer case
strength from partisanship, rather than case-specific facts, and have no
need to keep constant the relevant legal question to be decided by the
court. As a result, we can aggregate across a range of different legal
questions and more easily collect a dataset of sufficient size for
meaningful analysis. The alternative of studying only a single legal
question in these election cases, such as candidate eligibility based on
residential status, would not have been feasible. The applicable law
varies too much across jurisdictions, and more importantly, there are
too few such specific cases in our period of study to generate robust
analysis.

30. See Herbert M. Kritzer & Mark J. Richards, The Influence of Law in the Supreme Court's
Search-and-SeizureJurisprudence,33 AM. POL. REs. 33 (2005).
31. Id. at 42-43.
32. See id. at 52 (rejecting "the proposition of the attitudinalists that there is at best
negligible evidence that law matters").
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Although we find partisan consensus on strong cases, we found
partisan divergence where there was no signal of case strength. We
inferred case strength where there was a partisan mismatch between
winning litigant and lower court, but for cases where the partisanship
of the winning litigant and lower court matched, we could make no
inference of case strength. On these comparatively "weaker" cases, we
found that Democratic and Republican justices voted quite differently.
Democratic justices voted to affirm Democratic lower court decisions in
favor of Democratic litigants at a rate of 53.7%. They actually voted to
affirm Republican lower court decisions in favor of Republican litigants
at an even higher rate of 66.7%. Partisan loyalty to Democratic litigants
seems rebutted by this unexpected pattern.
By contrast, Republican justices displayed a predictable pattern
of partisan loyalty in cases without a signal of case strength.
Republicans voted to affirm Republican lower court decisions in favor
of Republicans 64.7% of the time, but they voted to affirm Democratic
lower court decisions in favor of Democrats just 35.7% of the time, the
lowest rate across all categories of cases. Republican justices voted to
affirm decisions in favor of their party at a significantly higher rate in
these "weaker" cases than decisions in favor of the Democratic litigant.
One possibility is that Republican justices are more influenced
by their partisan loyalty and vote, at a much higher rate than
Democratic justices, in their party's interest when case strength is not
indicated. Under this interpretation, Democratic supreme court justices
are less influenced by partisan loyalty and therefore affirm both
Republican and Democratic lower courts' partisan decisions at roughly
similar rates of 66.7% and 53.7%, respectively. The fact that Democratic
justices actually vote to affirm Republican victories at a higher rate
than Democratic victories evidences their lack of partisanship. By
contrast, the corresponding spread between favoring in-party lower
court decisions favoring the in-party on one hand, and favoring outparty lower court decisions favoring the out-party on the other hand, is
large for Republican justices and in the predictably partisan direction.
All in all, this greater partisanship by Republicans in these cases
accounts for most of the partisan asymmetry discovered in this and even
our earlier work.
There is support in political science for the notion that
Republicans are more prone to partisanship along these lines. Political
science documents the Republican Party's superior campaign finance
and institutional capacities. The Republican Party enjoys clear
institutional advantages vis-A-vis the Democratic Party in terms of
state and local party budget size, organizational complexity, expertise
in media relations and campaign operations, and financial support for
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candidates, 33 all of which continue through today. 34 These advantages
contribute to Republican effectiveness in achieving party goals,
including the profile of candidates who reach the state supreme court
and how they vote once on the bench. In addition, the Republican Party
enjoys greater internal homogeneity than the Democratic Party. There
is greater ideological agreement among Republicans because
Republicans are more solidly conservative than Democrats are solidly
liberal at every level of the two parties. 35 Republican advantages in
homogeneity made it easier over the years for the Republicans to stay
unified, maintain confidence in the party's ideological direction, and
exercise loyalty to their party's candidates. This greater loyalty to the
party likely holds true even for the party's elected judges sitting on state
supreme courts in these election cases.
This account of partisan asymmetry fits the existing political
science, but we also offer an alternative wrinkle less grounded in any
empirical literature. Republican justices voted to uphold lower court
decisions by Republicans at a rate of 66.6% in favor of Democratic
litigants and a rate of 64.7% in favor Republican litigants. They also
33. See James L. Gibson et al., Assessing Party OrganizationalStrength, 27 AM. J. POL. SCI.
193, 213 (1983) (noting that Republican party organizations showed greater organizational
strength with less intraregional variation); James L. Gibson et al., Party Dynamics in the 1980s:
Change in County Party OrganizationalStrength, 1980-1984, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 67 (1989); Gary
C. Jacobson, Party Organization and Distribution of Campaign Resources: Republicans and
Democrats in 1982, 100 POL. SCI. Q. 603, 603 (1985).
34. See Sidney M. Milkis & Jesse H. Rhodes, George W. Bush, the Republican Party, and the
"New"AmericanParty System, 5 PERSP. ON POL. 461, 461 (2007) (assessing the successful effort of
the Bush II administration in building the Republican party at the congressional, grassroots, and
organizational levels); Anthony Paik et al., PoliticalLawyers: The Structure of a NationalNetwork,
36 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 892, 907 (2011) (noting that conservative group networks are stronger
than liberal group networks); see also Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, Billionaires Going Rogue, N.Y.
TIMES: CAMPAIGN STOPS (Oct. 28, 2012, 10:53 PM), http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/
2012/10/28/billionaires-going-rogue/
[https://perma.cc/9QGV-9KY2]
("In recent years, the
Democratic Party organization has gained some strength and it plays a much more active role in
campaigns at all levels than in the past, but as an institutional force capable of command and
control, it remains light years behind the Republican Party.").
35. See MArr GROSSMANN & DAVID A. HOPKINS, ASYMMETRIC POLITICS: IDEOLOGICAL
REPUBLICANS AND GROUP INTEREST DEMOCRATS (2016) (characterizing the Republican Party as

an ideological movement, and the Democratic Party as a social group coalition); THOMAS E. MANN
& NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT'S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM (rev. ed. 2016) (describing ideological

cohesion and extremism of the national Republican Party); D. Jason Berggren, Two Parties, Two
Types of Nominees, Two Paths to Winning a Presidential Nomination, 1972-2004, 37
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 203, 210-11 (2007) (describing the different political cultures of the
Republican and Democratic Parties); Christopher Bruzios, Democratic & Republican Party
Activists & Followers: Inter- & Intra-Party Differences, 22 POLITY 581, 601 (1990) ("The data
presented in this study not only show a Republican party with fewer intra-party differences than
the Democrats, but also an electorate shifting to the right."); Barry C. Burden, Candidate
Positioning in US Congressional Elections, 34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 211, 219-20 (2004) (concluding
that almost all Republicans are uniformly to the right of political center, but that Democrats are
less cohesively left of center).
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affirm Democratic lower court decisions in favor of Republican litigants
at an 86.4% rate. It is for Democratic lower court decisions in favor of
Democrats where the affirmance rate drops dramatically to 35.7%.
What is more, the lowest affirmance rate by Democratic justices is for
the same set of cases-Democratic lower court decisions in favor of
Democratic litigants. The Democratic justices' affirmance rates for
other categories of cases are higher, if not necessarily by a statistically
significant margin.
In this alternative telling, it may be that Democratic lower court
decisions for Democratic litigants are somehow suspect such that even
Democratic justices voted to affirm only 53.7% of the time. Democratic
distrust of Democratic lower courts actually would be surprising.
Research suggests that judges tend to trust their in-party judges more
than out-party judges for authority, and especially so as case salience
increases. 36 By contrast, in this alternative telling, both Republican and
Democratic justices are more confident in Republican lower courts and
affirm their partisan decisions for Republicans at nearly the same
rate. 37 This alternative interpretation gains credibility from the fact
that Democratic lower courts decided for Democratic litigants in 76% of
cases, compared to a much lower 46.4% rate by Republican lower courts
in favor of Republican litigants. Perhaps state supreme court justices of
both parties are simply correcting for partisanship by the Democratic
lower courts in these particular cases.
We urge a bit of caution in this interpretation. It appears
compelling mainly because Democratic justices vote to affirm
Republican lower court decisions for Republicans at a higher rate than
Democratic lower court decisions for Democrats. This counterpartisan
pattern suggests that Democratic justices distrust Democratic lower
courts by comparison. But the number of cases where Democratic
justices reviewed Republican lower court decisions for Republicans is
quite small and very sensitive to a slight variance in the data. Just four
additional votes to reverse in these cases would have erased this
counterpartisan pattern and made Democratic affirmance rates
identical for Republican and Democratic lower court decisions in favor
36. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Bias in Judicial Citations:A Window into the
Behaviorof Judges?, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 87, 119 (2008) (finding that federal appellate judges tend
to cite judges of the opposite party significantly less, especially in cases dealing with high-stakes
subject matter).
37. Another, slightly different, possibility is that Republican lower courts are better than
Democratic ones at anticipating state supreme court preferences in these cases and better tailor
their judgments to draw approval. See Stephen J. Choi et al., What Do Federal District Judges
Want? An Analysis of Publications, Citations, and Reversals, 28 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 518, 519 (2012)
(theorizing that federal district courts seek appellate affirmance and tailor decisions to circuit
judges' partisan preferences).
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of their respective in-party litigants. If these rates were identical for
Democratic justices, then it would appear most clearly that the
Democratic justices were affirming election cases almost identically
regardless of litigant partisanship, while votes by Republican justices
diverged severely depending on the winning litigant's partisanship in
these cases.
CONCLUSION

This Article provides substantive and methodological payoffs for
the study of law's influence on judicial decisionmaking. Substantively,
we show that law matters for judicial decisionmaking even when
political considerations are highly salient. Case strength in election
cases increases the likelihood that state supreme court justices decide
in the winning litigant's favor. Case strength matters for both
Democratic and Republican justices, whether the winning litigant is of
the same party or not. As expected, justices from both parties were most
likely to vote to affirm when case strength aligned with their partisan
interests, in roughly nine cases out of ten. However, case strength
regularly trumped partisan loyalty where they conflicted as well.
Justices from both parties voted to affirm at high rates when the
winning litigant below was from the opposite party but nonetheless
brought a relatively strong case.
Methodologically, we reach these findings about the influence of
law by a new means of operationalizing case strength. We leverage the
clear expectation of judicial partisanship in election cases, supported by
our earlier work, to identify cases where we can infer sufficient case
strength on the legal merits to overcome the usual tendency toward
partisan loyalty. Election cases provide the cleanest setting to apply our
operationalization of case strength because these are cases where an
expectation of judicial partisanship is unusually high, and there are few
other explanations for the partisan patterns of judicial decisionmaking
to be found. As a result, marked deviation from partisan expectation in
these cases offers a particularly clear inference of case strength that we
exploit here. That said, our methodological innovation of inferring case
strength on the merits might nonetheless be transferable to other
categories of decisions beyond election cases. The basic insight we
develop here is inferring case strength indirectly from patterns of
judicial decisionmaking that defy the usual expectations of judicial
ideology or partisanship. Where judges decide cases in ways that cannot
be explained by reference to the typical predictive political criteria, it
suggests that judges may be motivated by case-specific legal
considerations that override the political ones.

